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Abstract
This thesis examines the potential impact of community oriented policing in Latin
America through a series of case studies from Brazil, Mexico, Chile, Colombia and El
Salvador dating from the early 1990’s to the present. They are analyzed through a
typology that organizes community oriented policing strategies according to costliness to
the police. Costliness is defined as the amount of power that the police have to renounce
to the community to implement a certain strategy. The thesis concludes that community
oriented policing is an improvement over militarized policing strategies as it has the
possibility to enhance both human security and state legitimacy in the region.
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Chapter One: Introduction
Every state in the world currently has a police force of some sort to,
theoretically, enforce laws and regulate society. A more specific definition of the
police is, according to David Bayley, that they are, “people authorized by a group to
regulate interpersonal relations within the group through application of physical
force.”1 Another definition, from Diamint says that they are, “a state’s apparatus to
regulate the daily acts of citizens, ensure order, and organize and implement
procedures for law enforcement…They are lawfully authorized to use force to
guarantee order and respect for the law.”2
As demonstrated with the definitions above, the legitimate application of the
use of force is key to defining the police’s role. This remains an issue in many parts
of the world where police continue to apply force illegally, for example through
torture, disappearances, and extrajudicial killings. In a democratic society in
particular the abuse of force is generally considered unacceptable. This may cause
one to ask something which scholars have wrestled with for a long time, namely,
what is a democracy and a democratic society? Although answering this question is
outside the scope of this paper, one useful definition is that a democracy exists when
1

John Bailey and Lucia Dammert eds. Public Security and Police Reform in the Americas. Pittsburgh,
PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2006. 19
2

Jorge Dominguez and Anthony Jones eds. The Construction of Democracy. Baltimore: The Johns
Hopkins University Press, 2007. 149

1

formal institutions operate and when basic civil, political, and legal rights for the
institutions’ operation are extended to the general population.3 Extending these
rights to the general population always includes some form of political elections (a
government with elections is frequently called a “polyarchy”) and freedom of
expression.4 The definition also usually includes respect for the “rule of law,” which
means that every person has access to certain rights under the law, and to enforceable
judicial provisions if these rights are abrogated.5 In addition, the state should be
accountable to its citizens, which means that the people should be able to hold elected
officials and government institutions responsible for transgressions they may
commit.6
Though these rights and the definition of the role of the state have changed
and evolved over time, one of the fundamental roles of the state is the provision of
security.

Security is the foundation for the modern state system because people

initially came together in towns or villages for protection (and commerce). The
security in villages also enabled the growth of trade. In current times, the police
typically provide domestic security and the definition of security has expanded to
3

Enrique Desmond Arias and Daniel Goldstein. Violent Democracies in Latin America. Durham:
Duke University Press, 2010., 3
4

Guillermo O’Donnell. "Polyarchies and the (Un)Rule of Law in Latin America." Latin American
Studies Association. (1998). http://lasa.international.pitt.edu/LASA98/O'Donnell.pdf (accessed June 12,
2013).
5

Ibid

6

Marcelo Bergman and Laurence Whitehead eds. Criminality, Public Security, and the Challenge to
Democracy in Latin America. Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 2009., 9
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“human security,” which purports to explain how persons in a nation should be able
to live. Human security is defined as, “the freedom of individuals and communities
from threats posed by conflict and violence to their physical, social or cultural
integrity or survival.”7 This definition clarifies that people in a state should
theoretically be free from violence from both non-governmental actors and from the
state itself. Therefore one could say that if a state fails to provide security for its
people, and particularly if the people suffer from elevated levels of violence, then the
state is not a democracy.
Because of the elevated levels of violence throughout Latin America, most
scholars agree that while the majority of the region (excluding Cuba) has democratic
governments they are, “far from perfect.”8 Guillermo O’Donnell says that most Latin
American countries are, “third stage” democracies, which means that while the
majority of states have competitive elections and freedom of expression, they still
lack the ability to enforce the rule of law because of weak criminal justice branches
and widespread corruption.9 Consequently, professionalizing and democratizing
police forces (and other aspects of the criminal justice system such as the judiciary
and the penitential system) is key to encouraging democratic growth and citizen
security in the region. Because of this many reform attempts have been made thus

.

7

Kees Koonings and Dirk Krujit. Fractured Cities. New York, NY: Zed Books, 2007 , 13

8

Arias and Goldstein, 3

9

Lucia Dammert. "Reforma Policial en America Latina." Seguridad Ciudadana. (2005).
http://dspace.uah.es/dspace/bitstream/handle/10017/7794/reforma_dammert_QUORUM_2005.pdf?seq
uence=1 (accessed June 12, 2013). 56
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far. Democratic policing has a different definition than the earlier policing
definitions, it includes, accountability to the law and not to itself, accountability to
democratic structures and the community, transparency, professionalism, and being
representative of the community it serves.10
This sort of policing remains elusive throughout Latin America, and indicators
for state and non-state violence show “persistent human rights violations, an increase
in homicides and domestic conflict…some countries also continue to use torture.”11
This occurs in areas that actually have police and state presence; in some nations
there are “governance voids,” where the state, and police, are virtually nonexistent.
One example are the guerrilla and/or paramilitary controlled regions in Colombia.
Other examples are the many shantytowns surrounding major Latin American cities
that are controlled by gangs and lack government presence.12
When the police do enter these areas they typically enter in a heavily armed
and aggressive manner, which frequently leads to human rights abuses and the
murder of innocent civilians. Because of this, entire segments of the population fear
the police, and in many parts of Latin America the people see them as a, “source of
crime rather than guarantor of civil rights.”13 If the police are the only contact with
the state, then the people will fear the state as well. Using the police as a proxy for
10

Sankar Sen. Enforcing Police Accountability through Civilian Oversight. Los Angeles: SAGE,
2010., 9
11

Arias and Goldstein, 236

12

Koonings and Krujit, 13

13

Dominguez and Jones, 160
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democracy in a country is frequently used by scholars precisely because they are the
part of the state which people have most contact with on a regular basis, and so a
legitimate police force is key to both crime reduction and ensuring state legitimacy.14
As discussed earlier, the police are legally permitted to use violence under
certain circumstances; however, throughout Latin America the illegal use of police
violence is frequent. Arias and Goldstein define the illegal use of state violence as,
“disproportionate use of force to suppress opposition, create a state of fear and
exercise state terror.”15 Examples of this can include extrajudicial killings, torture,
and other forms of coercive violence. According to Fruhling, the poor tend to suffer
“disproportionately,” from police abuses. He says that this is partially because there
is an underlying acceptance of institutional violence in Latin America, because police
attitudes favor the wealthy, and because there are inadequate civilian controls over
the police; this last issue has lead to widespread impunity because the police know
that they can get away with committing crimes.16 Dammert concurs that the police in
Latin America do not respond to all members of society equally and that their actions
are conditioned by perceived socioeconomic differences.17
One of the most common responses by the state to the crime increase has been
Mano Dura (strong-arm) policing. This typically entails mass arrests and increased
14

Dammert (2005), 54

15

Arias and Goldstein, 229

16

Joseph Tulchin and Meg Ruthenburg. Toward a Society Under Law. Washington D.C.: Woodrow
Wilson Center Press, 2006., 19
17

Dammert (2005), 55
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police abuses and is, “likely to accentuate the climate of violence and distrust.”18
These policies are usually initially supported and initiated by the community because
a spike in crime often leads to the election of politicians who promise to take a strong
stance against it.
One of the best examples of Mano Dura policing occurred in El Salvador,
where the government passed laws during the 2000’s (Mano Dura Part I in 2003 and
Mano Dura Part II in 2008) legitimizing the arrest of anyone who looked like they
might belong to a gang while increasing the amount of time people could be
incarcerated without trial. These policies led to an increase in the prison, and gang,
populations, and failed to decrease violence and illicit activities. Prisons have been
called, “finishing schools” for gang members precisely because imprisoned gang
members have the opportunity to make contacts and learn from more experienced
gang members.19 This means that all these policies created were the largest prison
populations in the Americas and more gang members. These laws eventually further
contributed to the lack of trust between the police and the community, as people
started to see relatives, friends and neighbors arrested indiscriminately.
In addition to current police abuses, many nations in Latin America have a
long history of repressive governments, frequently through either military juntas or
right-wing dictatorships. Throughout the region these systems of government were
dismantled during the 1980’s and 1990’s, which means that the memory of the police
acting as a repressive state agent, causing disappearances, and torturing remains
18

Bergman and Whitehead, 13

19

Cynthia Arnson ed. “In the Wake of War.” Woodrow Wilson Press, 2012. pp. 317-341.
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present among the population. Of the nations that will be discussed later in the case
studies, Chile had a right-wing dictatorship from1973-1990, El Salvador had one (in a
long line of autocratic dictatorships) from 1979-1992 which ended after a bloody civil
war and Brazil had a military junta from 1964-1985. In each of these nations the
police was used as an element of repression and was frequently a military branch, in
other words the domestic police was controlled by and lead by members of the
military.
This history explains why the boundary between domestic security, which
should be provided by the police, and international security, which should be
provided by the military, is often blurred in Latin America with the military taking a
wide role in areas which are considered part of the police’s purview in most other
nations. An excellent example of this is the military’s role in the war against the
TCO’s (transnational criminal organizations) in Mexico. Arias and Goldstein also
note that the police in many Latin American countries is still called the policia militar
(military police). The military police was usually left untouched after the
democratization process; this occurred in both Brazil and Chile.20 As will be
discussed further in the case study chapter, the police in these nations retained their
hierarchical structure, militaristic nature, and minimal civilian government oversight.
As mentioned earlier, crime and corruption are serious issues in Latin
America, and demonstrate the weakness of the state and the police. The whole region
experienced a major crime wave, which began after the fall of most of the regions
20

Arias and Goldstein, 238

7

dictatorships in the late 1980’s and early 1990’s. Homicides rose 41% between 1998
and 2008, and in some countries the level of violent, and non-violent crime, remains
noticeably elevated to this day.21 In addition to crime, Bailey and Dammert identify
other threats to public security in Latin America including, “violence, terrorism and
domestic institutions characterized by incompetence, corruption and impunity.”22
2011 data shows that Latin America is the most violent region in the world,
with homicide rates twice the world average; 25% of these homicides are believed to
be TCO or gang related.23 In addition, the region has the most “most dangerous
cities,” in the world, including all of the cities in the top twenty of the ranking.24
When studying crime and violence in Latin America, one must bear in mind that
some Latin American countries remain the main producers and transporters for plant
based (and other) narcotics for the world. The financial gains from U.S. and
European drug consumption has helped fuel illicit groups and consequently violence
in the region.
According to Arias and Goldstein, the frequency of crime, and of violent
crime especially, “concretely affect[s] lived political experience[s]”25 in Latin
21

Bergman and Whitehead, 93-94

22

Bailey and Dammert, 11

23

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, "Global Study on Homicide ." Last modified 2011.
Accessed June 12, 2013. http://www.unodc.org/documents/data-andanalysis/statistics/Homicide/Globa_study_on_homicide_2011_web.pdf.
24

Joshua Berlinger. "The 50 Most Dangerous Cities in the World." Business Insider, 10 9, 2012.
http://www.businessinsider.com/most-dangerous-cities-in-the-world-2012-10?op=1 (accessed June 12,
2013).
25

Arias and Goldstein, 4
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America, hence most voters rank crime of equal importance as the economy when
polls are taken. Unger concurs with Arias and Goldstein and says that crime
“corrodes,” everyday life in Latin America.26 For example, he notes that in many
places people are afraid to go out at night because of how common crime is, and says
that this reduces the sense of community among people. He says that crime has also
permeated power relations between state and society, enhanced geographic
differences among regions and damaged civil society.27 He finds that violence has
allowed the state to take on more powers, and that it frequently uses violence and
crime as justification for repressive anti-crime policies. Corruption, or at least the
perception of corruption, also remains problematic throughout most nations in Latin
America at all levels of government, from local police at the bottom all the way up to
ministers in major federal agencies.28 Like crime, this can damage the social fabric
and further reduce the people’s trust in their government.
The graph below illustrates the per capita homicide rates for the nations which
will be discussed later in the case study section. In all countries, excepting Brazil and
Chile, a clear spike in violence is noticeable (note that there is also more limited data
for these two nations). Although these two countries did not register spikes, many
Brazilian cities did individually, and in Chile there was an elevated perception of
insecurity during the 1990’s after the government democratized. The perception of

26

Mark Unger. Policing Democracy. Washington D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2011., 71

27

Ibid

28

Transparency International, "Corruption Perceptions Index 2012." Last modified 2012. Accessed
June 12, 2013. http://cpi.transparency.org/cpi2012/results/.

9

insecurity can be almost as damaging as insecurity itself, because people regardless
perceive the state as having less control over crime. Likewise, the perception of
increased security, even if it is not immediately apparent in data, can greatly help the
state (and politicians) because the people think that the situation is improving.
Figure 1: Graph Shows per Capita Homicides in Selected Countries
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A note on data collection in Latin America, and the data used throughout this
paper, should be made. Throughout Latin America there is a “dearth of data”
regarding crime, although there has been an improvement in the past twenty years.30
The most reliable estimate for general crime frequently comes from the homicide rate
because it has been tracked most often throughout the region; the homicide rates do
clearly show that the region has the world’s highest per capita homicide rates outside
29

Graph shows per capita homicides, the data from the UNODC, the graph is the authors own

30

Bergman and Whitehead, 3-4

10

of war zones.31 The lack of data can be attributed to many sources, including police
and government corruption and incompetence.
An additional issue is that government agencies within nations, and
international organizations such as the UNODC, IADB, and Interpol all report
differently and show different data; Unger says that this is a problem throughout the
region even in nations such as Costa Rica, Chile and Uruguay which generally have
better crime statistics than the rest of Latin America.32 Within countries, homicides
are also typically classified as intentional or unintentional and only the intentional
homicides are reported to international agencies; this is an area where the numbers
can easily be altered, and where, more innocently, countries can simply use different
metrics. In Mexico specifically they have even started breaking down intentional
homicides as between those thought to be caused by TCO’s and those unrelated to
TCO’s; this has recently come under some scrutiny and led to controversy because it
appears that the new Pena Nieto administration is intentionally moving some of the
homicides thought to be caused by TCO’s into the unrelated category.33
Recently, some countries, and independent organizations such as the
LatinoBarometro and the Latin American Public Opinion Project through Vanderbilt
University, have started conducting victimization studies which conduct public

31

Bailey and Dammert, 7-8

32

Unger, 49

33

Alejandro Hope. Mexico's Violent Crime Numbers Don't Add Up, "InSight Crime." Last modified
04 24, 2013. Accessed June 12, 2013. http://www.insightcrime.org/news-analysis/mexico-violentcrime-numbers-add-up.
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opinion polls to discover how many people have experienced crime and what kind,
how many have experienced corruption and by which part of the government, what
crimes people are most concerned about, etc., and this has expanded the available
data somewhat.34 Although these polls cannot answer all the questions or cover all
facets of society, one of the major findings has been that on average people in Latin
America only report between 25% and 30% of crimes to the authorities because they
distrust the police, and regardless do not believe that the police is capable of solving
the crimes.35 This unreported crime is frequently referred to as the cifra negra (black
number) in Latin America, and the percentage of unreported crime is frequently
debated in both the media and in the political arena. For example, official
government numbers may give one estimate whereas independent sources will give
another. This adds to the overall unreliability of data and demonstrates the great
distrust with which most people view the police.
As discussed above, most of Latin America suffers from elevated crime rates
and poor policing. This poor policing reflects on the state itself and on democracy in
the region because a nation is not fully democratic until most of its citizens believe
that they can rely on their state to provide security, and as of right now many Latin
American states are not succeeding in this area. The police are clearly important to
improving security because they are traditionally the main providers of domestic

34

Vanderbilt University, "Latin American Public Opinion Project." Accessed June 12, 2013.
http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/.
35

Bailey and Dammert, 9
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security, and because their physical presence is evidence of state presence and their
actions can be taken to represent the state.
Because of the police’s importance to a state, and their weakness and
corruption in Latin America, I thought that exploring alternative forms of policing in
Latin America could be a useful study, and one of the most frequently discussed types
of “good” or “democratic” policing is community oriented policing. This thesis aims
to explore community oriented policing as a way to improve human security and state
legitimacy in the region. In the next chapter, I will attempt to define and create a
typology of community oriented policing because this form of policing lacks a formal
definition and because the term is frequently used without explanation, and will
discuss concerns with the model. After this I will include a chapter with case studies
from Brazil, Mexico, Chile, Colombia and El Salvador; these case studies illustrate
various attempts at community oriented policing from the national to the local level.
I will subsequently try to fit these cases into my typology to analyze whether or not
any of them achieve community oriented policing. Lastly, I will conclude by
analyzing whether or not community oriented policing is the best option for police
reform given the information in this thesis.

13

Chapter Two: What is Community Oriented Policing?
Community oriented policing is, in the words of Hugo Fruhling, “quite
popular.”36 Wisler and Onwudiwe concur and say that it has, “become the almost
unchallenged definition of good and democratic policing…it is the ideological and
policy model espoused in mission statements, police goals, and reform programs by
practically all policing forces.”37 Although, as these quotes demonstrate, it is
generally agreed that community oriented policing is very popular, it lacks an official
definition. Instead, many scholars, governments, and police services have attempted
to define community oriented policing independently. To give a sampling of the
breadth of definitions a few are listed below.
Unger defines it as “a preventive approach based on making society the first
line of defense against crime and insecurity,”38 whereas Sen refers to it as
“arrangements in policing that accord a significant role to the community in defining

36

Hugo Fruhling. "A realistic look at Latin American Community Policing Programs ." Policing and
Society. (2011). http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10439463.2011.636816 (accessed June 19, 2013)., 76
37

Dominique Wisler, and Ihekwoaba Onwudiwe. Community Policing International Patterns and
Comparative Perspectives. Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press, 2009. Vii
38

Unger, 9-10
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and guiding policing in their localities.”39 Dominguez and Jones expand further and
define it as, “more than merely controlling law and order and fighting crime. It
responds to new management criteria in public administration (economy, efficiency
and effectiveness) and legitimizes the presence of the police in the urban arena.”40
Other authors do not define it specifically and instead explain how it has been
implemented in North America and Europe, which is where the model has its roots.
For example Fruhling says that it should: (1) emphasize preventive action in the
neighborhood (2) promote the establishment of close ties with the community to
promote feedback (3) the police should try to mobilize the community to take
preventive actions and (4) police actions should reflect knowledge of about
conditions and circumstances that are conducive to crime.41
Although community oriented policing (COP) lacks a consensual model, there
are common themes throughout the definitions. For example, all the definitions say
that it entails greater involvement with the community. This in turn should
theoretically reduce police violence, because the police become familiar with the
community and vice versa which means that they lose both some of their impunity
and form relationships with the people. These relationships in turn should enable the
police to prevent crime through better intelligence. Throughout the definitions and
discussions on community oriented policing the formation of trusting bonds between
the police and the community is key to success. In addition, COP is proactive instead
39

Sen, 30

40

Dominguez and Jones, 164

41

Wisler and Onwudiwe, 292
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of reactive policing because it focuses on crime prevention. Preventing crime and
reducing police violence and corruption, which a solid community policing program
should achieve, are attractive goals for politicians in parts of the world such as Latin
America where violence and corruption are key political and human security issues.
This explains why there has been a growth in community policing programs since the
1990’s throughout the region.
Virtually all countries now claim that their police take into consideration the
needs of the community and accept that they must work with the community to solve
crime successfully, partially because, as mentioned earlier, community oriented
policing is now “synonymous” with good and democratic policing. In the next
section I will be presenting a series of case studies from Brazil, Mexico, El Salvador,
Chile and Colombia where community policing has been attempted at many levels,
from the municipal or state-wide to the federal. Before presenting the case studies, I
have attempted to create a typology of community oriented policing as it is found in
Latin America so as to better organize the case studies and analyze why or why not
the programs succeeded.
According to Fruhling, police reform can be divided into two types, “Genuine
efforts that seek to transform the police force versus efforts that seek to merely
project a better image of the police.”42 However, it seems to me that one can find
three types of police reform when looking specifically at community oriented
policing programs. I discuss them in descending order from least to most costly for
the police below, the more community involvement the program entails the more
42

Frühling, December 2011, 79
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costly it is to the police because community involvement requires the police to
voluntarily renounce a portion of their power and give it to the community (or to
other government agencies, civil society groups, etc.)
The first type is when policing services supposedly implement “community
policing” while barely utilizing community oriented policing strategies. In this type,
police services and governments use COP as a public relations strategy to make their
police services appear more democratic and open. As discussed earlier, virtually all
governments and police services now say that they involve the community in their
programs; however, many do not actually involve the community. I include creating
community councils and then either ignoring them or dismantling them after one or
two meetings in this section because they are a way for the government to claim that
they are involving the community without actually doing so. Another low-cost
mechanism could be installing a complaints and concerns email or box, which can
then be ignored.
The second type is divided into two groups of community oriented policing
programs, between programs that are more or less costly for the police.
The less costly programs generally entail programs that the police can take
without actually involving the community. One example is block-by-block policing
(also called “sector” and “quadrant” policing). Although this may be effective
because it enables the police to get to know the area and the people, it does not
usually involve the community in its design and implementation. Another example is
implementing a crime-mapping program. Although this may help the police identify
17

crime hot spots and enable prevention, it likewise requires minimal community
involvement. Many crime-mapping programs are run through universities or nonprofits, and so they do require the police to interact with members of the community
but only with a limited amount of people. Another example is programs at youth
centers and in schools, this may allow for greater community engagement; however,
if the police are just lecturing young people it does not require them to interact with
them and hear their input. One excellent example of this was the DARE program in
the U.S., which was widespread and eventually largely dismissed as a failed program
because of how few young people it apparently influenced.
A few common programs could be ranked under either the less or more costly
section depending on the specific case. For example, community councils, which are
one of the most frequently and rapidly implemented community-policing like
strategies, could be costly if the police genuinely take the citizens complaints and
suggestions and try to act upon them, or they can be a forum for people to vent their
frustration without the police having to do anything. Many are also started and then
stopped because of lack of commitment from either the police or the community
members sitting on the council. Another example of this could be neighborhood
watch groups and phone trees because the police could help set these up, and then
ignore their recommendations or fail to continue supporting them. These are also
problematic because some people view them as the state trying to pass its
responsibility for providing security onto the community. Another case-dependent
example is creating a citizens complaint channel, as mentioned in the first section,
18

because this could enable greater community involvement or the complaints could be
ignored. A final case-dependent example is maintaining the same police in an area
during block policing. Although this decision can be taken by the police without
community input it can be costly because it removes some scheduling power from
higher-ranking officers in the chain of command and means that manpower is
theoretically committed to a certain area, which means that they can’t transfer officers
or place them on temporary details.
The programs I identify as even more costly require greater community
engagement and the police giving up more of their power. These may include
engaging the people in strategy formation, for example the police could consult with
the community about how best to tackle a specific problem, such as street level drug
sales, through a community council or some other mechanism. More costly strategies
also include greater social components, for example when police work with social
workers, teachers etc. to develop programs. All of these should make the police more
aware of the communities “needs and interests” and force them to start focusing on
the concrete issues that have the greatest impact on the communities.43
Another very costly step is actually developing and publishing clear indicators of
police effectiveness and evaluation mechanisms because this means that the police
can be judged. Interestingly, the evaluation stage is the one most frequently forgotten
in Latin American police reform programs, perhaps because governments do not want
to publicize that their efforts failed. This also requires community engagement

43

Tulchin and Ruthenberg, 23

19

because it typically requires victimization surveys to be performed by unbiased
outside actors. Once these are published the police can be called to account for their
actions by the government, society, and the media in addition to the international
community. Another costly step is municipal government and community
involvement from the beginning of a programs design, because it means that outside
actors have oversight and insight into the program from the start.
Other costly steps need to take place within the government and police structure.
They can include, for example, giving greater autonomy to local police chiefs to
enable them to make better decisions for their community. This replaces the existing
hierarchical system, and is extremely costly to the central police and state, because it
will probably engender resistance among higher-ranking officers. Giving greater
discretion to local chiefs and lower-ranking police officers, or decentralizing the
police command system, is one of the major obstacles to police reform encountered
throughout Latin America. Another major obstacle is enhancing oversight over the
police, this should happen at both the community and the government level, and once
oversight is established mechanisms to curb abuse should be implemented.
Most nations in Latin America (excluding Chile) now have an ombudsmans
office, which is supposed to investigate citizen complaints and abuses and
subsequently enable perpetrators prosecution. These were largely created to help
protect human and civil rights from abuse by the government, and in many cases,
from the police or the military in particular. Unfortunately these offices are

20

frequently understaffed, overworked, and lack real power and so other mechanisms
for monitoring the police should be implemented.
Another costly step for all governments is inter-agency coordination, and it is one
of the most difficult obstacles to overcome. An example of how this could impact
community oriented policing could be when police officers are supposed to work with
social services to help bring a certain service to a dangerous area. A final, and
extremely costly, step is a reduction in the use of force. As discussed earlier, the
police in Latin America tend to use force frequently and sometimes unnecessarily.
Pion-Berlin and Trinkunas say that reducing police violence requires:
“applying principles of necessity (react violently only when attacked violently),
proportionality (scale responses to the intensity, duration, and magnitude of the
aggression), rationality (take nonlethal measures first and do not provoke an
escalation of violence), and discrimination (distinguish between the violent and
those who are not).”44
Reforming the police so they follow these rules is difficult when they are used to
operating with impunity, as is convincing police who are used to using violence that it
is not necessarily the best strategy.
The final type is when a police department, or a nation as a whole, embraces
community policing as an all-encompassing philosophy. This entails both the less
and more costly community-policing programs. It should impact institutional culture,
mission and evaluation. At this level it also requires intensive community
participation and political will and leadership. Of the case studies that will be
discussed in the next chapter none reach this point except, perhaps, in the case of
44
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Santa Tecla in El Salvador. One must also note that many argue that achieving this
point is not possible, even in countries such as the U.S. and Great Britain that first
embraced community oriented policing.
Some authors say that what I discuss above is simply a difference in opinion
about what community policing should entail. One group understands community
policing as a strategy for the police to produce better intelligence through community
councils, “sector policing,” and other community oriented policing strategies,
whereas the other group assigns it a different role, and argues that communities are
meant to have a say in how they are policed; consequently it is a philosophy not a
strategy.45 I find that the two should not be separated because the second view is the
final stage that community oriented policing should eventually reach. At this stage,
the police should enjoy general legitimacy, and, as discussed in the previous chapter,
legitimization of the police contributes to legitimization of the state as a whole, and
they should benefit from the closer police-community relationship brought on by
COP.
Now that various types of community oriented policing strategies have been
discussed, and that I’ve hopefully clarified what it usually entails, a discussion on
implementing police reform is required. It is generally agreed that starting and
continuing any sort of policing strategy has three general steps, formulation,
implementation and evaluation, and that each are important for many reasons.
Formulating a COP strategy is the first step in the process, and can be
difficult. It should include input from members of local government, civil society and
45
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the police. It has been found that purely top down approaches, when it is imposed by
government; tend to fail because the police resist reforms imposed in that way
because they believe that that bureaucrats do not understand what it means to police.
Consequently the police should be involved in the programs design from the
beginning. In a best case scenario members of the police from various divisions and
levels would be invited to assist in formulation so that the lower ranks would not feel
excluded. Lower rank exclusion can lead to their rejecting new forms of police
reform, just as higher-ranking officers can reject it when they feel that the
government is imposing reform. In addition to considering various parties opinions,
the formulation stage also needs to take into consideration best practices, whether
domestic or international, the state’s financial capacity, and it should try to
realistically predict how long the program will take to implement so as to avoid
creating unrealistic expectations.
Police reform implementation is difficult and widely regarded as erratic
throughout the region, partially because it has many obstacles to overcome. The first
obstacle is gaining police acceptance for the strategy. As mentioned earlier, the
police in Latin America remain hierarchic and generally against demilitarizing. Many
authors also note that if higher ranks embrace reform the lower ranks won’t
necessarily and vice versa. Even if the state invests heavily in training police in
community policing techniques, institutional resistance can prevent the training from
being effective.
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The second obstacle is gaining the community’s trust. One reason, which
Unger notes, is that due to general distrust of the police in Latin America some people
view community policing as a way for the police to spy on people more efficiently.46
This may be due to the authoritarian past in many countries in Latin America, when
domestic spying was a large part of the police’s mission. He and Arias argue that the
best way to overcome a communities’ fear of the police is to initially engage through
trusted civil society actors who can mediate between the people and the police.47
Although this does seem to be a good strategy, it does not always appear to be
necessary and a trusted political actor may be able to serve this role as well.
Once police resistance is overcome, COP programs are usually started in a
pilot site, but they often fail to expand beyond the initial locations, or beyond a small
group of police trained in COP techniques. One reason for this may be community
apathy, many people do not necessarily want to serve on police-community boards or
neighborhood phone trees nor do they think they have time for it. Another problem,
which Koonings and Krujit note, is that due to the existing levels of violence in some
areas, communities are already fragmented and consequently finding people to serve
on boards will be difficult.48 In addition, if the community is very insecure, illicit
actors may threaten people who join community boards or other organizations and
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consequently they may be too afraid to join. Other implementation issues can include
general bureaucratic slowness, lack of qualified instructors, funding issues, lack of
political commitment or policy changes caused by changes in administration,
corruption and other problems that will be covered more specifically in the chapter on
case studies.
The final step in police reform is program evaluation. Evaluation of
community policing programs should include studies on the: (1) impact on the
reduction of crime and violence (2) perception of citizen insecurity (3) levels of
police violence and corruption (4) levels of trust/distrust between community and
police (5) expansion and continuity of the programs (6) collaboration with other
bureaucratic agencies.49 In addition to these I would recommend measuring the level
of community participation in community policing programs because, as will be
noted later in the case studies, community policing can be implemented; however, if
the community does not want to be involved with it the program will not succeed.
The percentage of unreported crime could be used as a proxy for community
participation because if the people do not trust the police enough to report crime then
they certainly will remain uninvolved in assisting with investigations and other COP
strategies. Various scholars note that evaluation seems to be the most ignored step
throughout Latin America in virtually all government programs. This theme will be
reiterated in the subsequent chapter on the case studies.
There are many concerns with the community-policing model. One concern is
that it rarely seems to have a noticeable impact on crime in any place where it has
49

Tulchin and Ruthenberg, 207

25

been implemented, including in the U.S., or that it has an uneven impact on crime.50
For example, community policing may decrease petty crime, but not homicides, or it
may have a greater impact in a higher income neighborhood than in a lower income
one. Some authors, such as Pion-Berlin and Trinkunas, argue that it will be
ineffective in Latin America because its emphasis on decentralization and
demilitarization will leave nations open to what they call “mid-level threats” such as
TCO’s and organized street gangs.51 They consequently recommend a national
“hybrid force,” that has the capacity to both engage with the community, for example
through block policing, but which also has a “surge capacity” to fight organized
crime. Other authors note that reforms to enhance accountability are sometimes
perceived in Latin America as damaging to the police’s decision-making capabilities
and that it will reduce police ability to commit to decisive action. 52 Another concern
is that community oriented policing may encourage neighbors to spy and report on
each other as they did during the dictatorships.
I hope that in the subsequent section my case studies will show that
community oriented and other types of preventive policing remain a better alternative
to the militarized policing model because they reduce police abuses and enhance the
community’s feeling of security as well as their faith in the state.
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Chapter Three: Case Studies
Case I: Brazil
As discussed earlier, Brazil has many similarities with other Latin American
countries such as its dictatorial history, high crime rates, and corrupt and generally
distrusted police. The image of heavily armed police charging into favelas in Rio de
Janeiro and Sao Paulo has become a frequent image on the news, particularly since
the country is preparing to host both the World Cup in 2014 and the Olympics in
2016. Because the favelas do not encourage the promotion of a new, modern, Brazil,
the government has stated that they want to “pacify” the favelas before these events.
Considering the countries high crime rate and continuing poverty (21.4 % of the
population lives below the poverty line)53, the governments various attempts at police
and other reforms are unsurprising. Just recently Brazilians have taken to the streets
to protest unfair government laws and widespread corruption at all levels of
government, and in some locations the police reacted with tear gas and violence. This
has led to new calls for reform and the nations President, Dilma Rousseff, has said
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that it will be forthcoming.54 This section will examine the police division in Brazil,
followed by a discussion on general police reform plans, followed by cases from Rio
de Janeiro, Belo Horizonte, and Sao Paulo.
Brazil is a decentralized federal nation with twenty-six states. Each state has a
Civilian Police Service (sometimes called the Judicial Police) that investigates crimes
and is in charge of administrative duties such as issuing identification cards. The
states also have Military Police units; these units are responsible for criminal
investigations, crime prevention and uniformed patrol. To this day they are
considered a part of the Brazilian Army Reserve. This police unit will be discussed in
all the cases. Brazil also has a Federal Police Department which investigates federal
crimes such as drug and human smuggling. They are also the head of Brazil’s
immigration authority. In addition to these three large police groupings, Brazil also
has a Federal Highway Police Department, a Federal Rail Police Department, a
National Public Safety Force (a uniformed federal force that was created to help state
governor’s when the police go on strike or if a crisis occurs), and municipal guards.55
Like in other Latin American countries, the police in Brazil are poorly paid and
corruption is endemic throughout the ranks.
In Brazil, the military junta negotiated their loss of power in 1985;
consequently they were initially able to retain many privileges such as six cabinet-
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level positions, the intelligence agencies and a role in the management of strategic
resources. Although their power has diminished considerably since then, for example
they no longer hold any cabinet level positions and the Cardoso administration (19942002) created a civilian ministry of defense to replace the service ministers, the
military continues to influence the military police.56 Leeds argues that since the
government democratized the criminal justice system is the part of the government
which has made the least progress, she points to the fact that it was virtually
unchanged by the 1988 Constitution, and that the police never moved from,
“protecting the state…to protecting its citizenry.”57
The lack of change is evident in the military police’s design. It retains a
hierarchical command structure and an emphasis on repressive rather than preventive
policing. Because the majority of policing reforms undertaken in Brazil have tried to
reform it, and because it appears to bear the most responsibility for police abuses in
Brazil, it will be discussed the most. Police abuse is a widespread and serious
problem, and can include everything from torture and extrajudicial killings to falsified
information in court and day-to-day corruption. According to official statistics, the
police in Rio killed 355 people in 1998; in 2003 they reportedly killed 1,195 people.58
These numbers continued to escalate. In 2007, at the peak of police killings, they
killed 1,330 people, in 2008 1,137, in 2009, 1,048 and in 2010, 855. The Washington
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Office on Latin America says that if one compares this with the amount of police
killed it is about a forty to one ratio, with forty citizens killed per police officer.59 Rio
is not the only city with a problem; the police in Sao Paulo apparently kill as many
people every two years as the military junta killed in the whole country during its 22year dictatorship.60
Throughout the country, the majority of people killed by the police are young,
Afro-Brazilian males, this has led to allegations of racism, and means that this
population has an even greater problem integrating into society and finding work
because they are stigmatized as criminals. This perpetuates the cycle of poverty and
enables their potential involvement in illicit markets. Many write that the violence in
Brazil will never end, and that police reform will never succeed because the police
force has, “resolutely defended its right to extort and kill with impunity.”61 To some
degree the perpetration of violence against civilians has been institutionalized in
Brazil, and until the mid 90’s police officers were given bonuses and promotions for
“bravery;” such as killing urban youth.62 Likewise the police are known for being
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corrupt and some reports claim that police recruits are taught how to extort before
they start working as police.63
Because of the general negativity surrounding the police, Brazilian politicians
at all levels have tried to ameliorate the situation. As discussed in an earlier chapter,
poor policing reflects the state and so if people lack trust in the police then they lack
trust in the state, consequently politicians have a clear interest in police reform. In
2000, then president-Cardoso proposed the National Plan for Public Security (PNSP,
Plan Nacional de Seguranca Publica). This plan was supposed to finance the
restructuring and professionalization of the police and address the lack of
standardization among the different police agencies.64 It included support for training
provincial police officers, incentives for community policing, and the creation of
police auditors. In 2002, Luiz Inacio da Silva’s administration took power and
decreased funding; Bailey and Dammert write that the plan never really took off the
ground, and that it was widely criticized.65 Subsequently the da Silva administration
proposed its own plan for security reform, called the Workers Party Plan; however,
this plan was apparently never implemented.66
The lack of continuation between administrations, as demonstrated in the
example above, is a common theme throughout police reform in Latin America, and
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is one of the many reasons why reforms fail frequently. Although these were some of
the first national security plans designed to address policing in the democratic era,
community policing was attempted in Brazil before these plans were proposed. The
first discussions of community policing occurred in the states of Sao Paulo and Rio de
Janeiro in 1982, after the first governor’s were democratically elected, and although
these initial discussions did not lead to any real changes they did set a precedent for
future reforms.67
I am going to begin my discussion on the different cities in this section with
Rio de Janeiro, the second largest city in Brazil by population, because the city has a
long history of police violence and attempted police reform. The city began in 2000
with the GPAE (Special Areas Policing Group), which was supposed to enhance
positive relations between favela residents and the police in certain favelas
surrounding the city, typically the ones closest to the wealthy areas. This program
was supposed to provide a police presence twenty-four hours a day. To implement
the program, the Military Police worked with a local NGO, Viva Rio, to provide
activities for at risk teens and promote police accountability.68 If the program
succeeded it was supposed to be expanded to all of the cities (at the time) 500 favelas.
The program initially fell under the leadership of Majors Carballo and Antunes, both
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of who, according to all accounts, were serious reformers and able to develop trusting
relationships with favela residents.69
Two of the favelas where GPAE was implemented were Tubarao and
Ceuzinho. These two are located near wealthier areas, and suffered a massacre in
May 2000, when members of the police killed five residents after invading the
favela.70 The massacre provided the political impetus to attempt to solve violence in
the community, particularly because it received widespread domestic and
international attention. GPAE as a whole was based off of Operation Cease Fire in
Boston, which was one of the original community based policing projects. Operation
Cease Fire was used to bring Boston’s gangs under control and is frequently cited as a
precursor to other community policing projects. In the favela itself, the police began
by initiating a social occupation, which means that the same police patrolled every
day, and the police had to go through a training program that was supposed to
increase their professionalism. The program did initially decrease violence
dramatically, and a rapport seemed to build between the residents and the police.71
Working with the NGO and social programs also helped encourage trust, as did
working with local power brokers. However, after three years violence returned after
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financing for the project ended and after Major Antunes, the trusted reformer, moved
on to work in Brasilia.
GPAE was similarly attempted in the Pavao-Pavozinho and Cantagalo favelas
from 2000-2002 and in the Cavalao favela from 2002 to 2004. Like in Tubarao and
Ceuzinho, the police were supposed to educate the youth about their role in the
community and focus on diminishing homicides. According to Fruhling they were
able to establish order and reduce shootouts through police presence and by enabling
residents access to social services.72 Like in the other favelas, the plan fell through
after a change of Major and Mayor. Fruhling notes that he does not consider it a form
of community policing and says that it was more a form of police control blended
with social assistance because it did not establish a dialogue with the community.73
In all of these cases the end result was the same, after initial successes
homicide rates climbed and police violence resumed. In addition, when the
community was polled, some members complained that the police remained corrupt
and that they did not receive sufficient funds from the state.74 The program also only
spread to six out of the cities five hundred favelas, and only 100 of the cities 33,000
police officers were engaged in the program.75 GPAE formally ended in 2005.
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The city started a similar program in 2008, but this one is called “Pacifying
Police Units,” or UPP. These are units within the military police that are specially
charged with policing the favelas after a special operations unit, called BOPE (short
for Batalhão de Operações Policiais Especiais) takes control of the streets. Initially
the BOPE unit did not warn local gangs that they were going to invade but they have
since changed this practice and have started warning them, this has led to a reduction
in deaths during the invasions.76 After the police retake the streets, social programs
are supposed to be introduced. Police officers in the UPP are recruited fresh out of
the academy after taking special training courses; this is supposed to prevent
corruption.77 In addition, the police officers are required to perform community
service in the favelas where they are stationed and they are better paid than the
average police officer. In 2010 the program was updated with “UPP Social” in
already pacified favelas, this is supposed to better coordinate services within the
favela and engage the community through meetings. The community is supposed to
be represented in these meetings by their Community Security Councils, and these
councils are supposed to advise the police and service providers about what their
community truly needs.78 WOLA says that polls of citizens living in these favelas
show that 83% of them think that their community is either “better” or “much better”
with the UPP as opposed to before.
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As of April 2013, UPP programs have spread to 30 favelas, and the program is
generally praised.79 Vanda Felbab-Brown notes that the UPP program has been more
successful than the GPAE program because of political support. The Mayor, Eduardo
Paes, who initiated the program, was reelected partially on the popularity of his
security program, as well as his skill in preparing for the major sporting events that
the city will be hosting.80 The Mayor has also successfully drawn in members of the
private sector and other NGO’s; prominent among them is AfroReggae, to the
pacified areas to assist in further engaging the community.81 However, the favelas
receiving the program remain those closest to wealthy and/or tourist areas. For
example, the most recent spread of the UPP was to the favelas near the Christ the
Redeemer Statue before a visit by Pope Francis. In addition, some groups say that the
initial action to “retake” the favelas is unnecessarily violent, because it is heavily
militarized and has lead to violence. The city also has continued issues with
corruption, including at very high levels within the police. A recent anti-corruption
sting called “Operation Guillotine,” resulted in 38 arrests, including the former
deputy chief of the Civil Police, on charges of (among other things) selling weapons
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and drugs back to local traffickers, and “involvement in prostitution and illegal
gambling.”82
With the updated “UPP Social” program it does appear that Rio is trying to
implement greater community oriented policing in the city; however, in my typology
I would say that it has elements of COP at most because they started a dialogue with
the community recently, and because the initial action remains extremely kinetic and
so it does not have the demilitarized components COP requires. In addition, the
programs slow spread means that most of the cities favela residents do not have
access to it. Another concern about the program regards the political motives for its
implementation, the UPP program has received a lot of positive press, but it has not
reached far and so one could wonder whether it is a PR move combined with an
attempt to better the areas near wealthy/tourist areas but not a genuine reform attempt.
This means that the program is not very costly to the police because they have
received positive press without engaging fully with the community while maintaining
a militarized component. However, the program does seem to be improving the lives
of the citizens in the favelas where it has been implemented, and police violence has
apparently decreased so it should be further expanded to other favelas and greater
attempts at police-community dialogue should be made. All reports indicate that the
city does plan on expanding UPP further, and so, one can hope, that it will also
expand to more outlying favelas.
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Although Belo Horizonte, the capitol of Minas Gerais, is not as large nor does
it have as many favelas as either Rio de Janeiro or Sao Paulo (it is the third largest
city in Brazil), the city approached COP in a unique manner and so it is worth
discussing. It began when academics in the criminology program at the local
university (called the Center for Studies in Criminality and Public Security, Centro de
Estudios de Criminalidad y Seguridad Pública or CRISP) started building ties to the
police through the first crime-mapping program in Brazil and by offering courses for
police. These courses eventually became police requirements. The crime-mapping
program was based off CompStat in the United States. Like CompStat it maps the
locations and times when crimes occur frequently.83 This is supposed to allow the
police to identify areas and times where/when they should, for example, patrol more.
Arias says that the partnership between academics and police has led to the best crime
data set in all Brazil.84
The data set was subsequently used to: evaluate the police, they called the
program “Policing with Results,” and create a community-policing program where
security councils were created in every precinct so community members could freely
debate security policies. De Mesquita Neto says that although people generally felt
safer once the program was implemented there was no noticeable reduction in crime
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and genuine communication with the community was lacking.85 He adds that the
poorer areas seemed to gain the least. De Mesquita Neto says that this occurred
because the communities were expected to help subsidize the new policing programs,
for example by funding new equipment purchases. Fruhling also notes that they had
problems coordinating with other public entities such as the mayors office and the
judiciary, and that many of the frequently encountered obstacles to change existed
such as, lack of funding, inability to maintain the same police in the same area, and
lack of identification with the program among lower ranking officers.86
The COP component of the Plan was based off the GPAE in Rio de Janeiro
called GEPAR (Grupo Especializado de Policiamento em Areas de Risco). Like the
program in Rio, they worked with a local nonprofit called Fica Vivo which created
programs for young people to prevent them from joining gangs. In addition they
focused on preventative policing, and on using violence sparingly and in a controlled
manner. A Professor from the University of Minas Gerais, Elenice de Souza, notes
that the program is based on continuous evaluation to monitor whether or not the
police are being effective.87 In addition to taking special courses, the GEPAR police
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are also supposed to commit to at least two years in GEPAR, so as to further enable
the community to get to know them and vice versa.
In the six favelas where GEPAR has been deployed it has halved homicides,
and polls show that 80% or more community members say that they have noted a
reduction in violence and that they feel safer.88 The community; however, continues
to support it hesitantly and two-thirds report continued corruption and half report
continued abuses and so the program cannot be called a total success.89 In addition,
many people give more credit to Fica Vivo than to the police for the programs
successes. De Souza also notes that youths are hesitant to join Fica Vivo’s activities
because it may lead to their being branded as a police informant and so they fear
retaliation from local gangs if they join. She believes that this has limited the
amount of youths the program can reach and weakened the Fica Vivo’s youth
outreach component.90 Arias and Unger find that regardless the involvement of Fica
Vivo has been necessary for the programs success because it provided a buffer
between the people and the police and enabled greater trust between them.
Like Rio de Janeiro, Belo Horizonte has elements of community oriented
policing but has not achieved it fully. Similarly, the program has spread slowly and
has had difficulties engaging with poor communities. However, I would say that it is
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more advanced than that of Rio because of the intense involvement with the
University which was involved from the beginning of the programs design, and which
continues to evaluate the program. The evaluation stage is key to community
oriented policing and it appears that in Belo Horizonte they are attempting to evaluate
programs in a serious and organized manner. As discussed in my typology,
evaluation is a costly step for institutions because it enables members of civil society
and the government to judge them in an informed manner and it makes it harder to
hide malfeasance. The intense involvement of Fica Vivo also seems to be one of the
main reasons for the programs success and proves that engagement with the
community is necessary for successful community oriented policing, and is costly
because they are relying on an outside actor to engage successfully.
All of this explains why Belo Horizonte is frequently cited as an example in
policing literature; it is one of the most innovative models tried so far, particularly in
Brazil and they do seem to be on their way towards spreading community oriented
policing throughout the city. As Fruhling approvingly notes, the GEPAR program,
“appears to be a first step in transforming the police into a truly modern, democratic
organization.”91 Taking this into consideration I would rank this program in the
higher second tier of my typology because various elements of community oriented
policing have been implemented, and because they appear to be trying to genuinely
engage with the community. It is not in the third tier because police and community
resistance to the reforms continues to exist, and because it has not spread throughout
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the city, and so it appears that the police as a whole has not adopted COP as more
than a strategy. As discussed in the typology, full community oriented policing
requires a cultural shift within the institution where it guides all their policing actions.
A working group in Sao Paulo, the largest city in Brazil, first proposed a
community-policing model in 1993 after 1992 was a record year for civilian
homicides (1,458) perpetrated by the police.92 Although this led to the creation of a
police ombudsman, little else happened until 1997 when there was another scandal.
Following this, the new governor fired the commander general of the military police
and created a community-policing commission with representatives from the military
police, the civilian police and the community.93 It was called the Advisory
Committee for the Implementation of Community Policing and members of the
community included representatives from human rights groups, community councils,
business councils, the Public Prosecutors Office, the Lawyers Guild of Brazil and
others. This commission established three main goals: to transform the military
police into an organization that consults and collaborates with the community, to
improve the efficiency and effectiveness of police services, and to improve public
safety through crime reduction, greater order and increased security.94
The police subsequently selected 41 zones to implement the project between
December 1997 and July 2001. Eventually half of all posts had community policing
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programs and smaller neighborhood sub-commissaries, and16,000 police officers
were trained in COP techniques.95 This led to increased preventive patrols, the
establishment of mobile stations, efforts to increase school security and drug
prevention, and the creation of neighborhood community councils. Although the
community councils were intended to increase community involvement, Fruhling
says that evaluations showed that the dialogue in the community councils was usually
unproductive.96
In 2000 the main business association in Sao Paulo created the Center for the
Study of Violence (ISPCV) and funded the “Disque Denuncia,” (“Crime Stoppers”)
program along with the state secretary of public security and the military and civilian
police. The program runs a call center to facilitate anonymous tips to the police; de
Mesquita Neto says that it has improved collaboration between the community and
the police, increased police effectiveness and efficiency in detecting and
apprehending criminals, and increased police responsiveness to community needs and
expectations and that its success is evidenced by the fact that it helped the police
solve over 9,000 crimes by 2003.97 The ISPCV is also one of the community
organizations on the community policing commission and has supported crime
mapping initiatives and held forums on enhancing public security and violence
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reduction.98 It exists to this day and partners frequently with the Center for the Study
of Violence at the University of Sao Paulo, and publishes public data on
denunciations and crime.99
Studies have shown that the community has generally responded positively to
these initiatives, even though concerns remain that it favors the wealthy and
particularly the business community because they are the major funders. However, a
public opinion poll showed that 56.9% of Sao Paulo’s residents find the community
police accessible, versus 10.5% for traditional police and that only .6% considered
community police officers corrupt versus 60.2% for traditional police. Although this
is very positive data, only 14.5% of persons polled said that they thought that
community police officers were more effective at solving crime.100
Like with Rio and Belo Horizonte, Sao Paulo shows the importance of
community involvement at all levels, and the difference that one dedicated
organization (in this case the business association) can make. However, it also brings
up a common concern with community oriented policing, that it may not be as
effective at preventing crime as a more militarized policing model. Although Sao
Paulo attempted to spread community oriented policing throughout the city, it
continues to experience high levels of violence and police abuse. In 2012 a gang war
broke out when the Primeiro Comando da Capital prison gang, revolted and killed
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over 140 people in one weekend; the police response was brutal and many
accusations of human rights abuses and police murders were subsequently leveled.101
The appropriate use of force is key to community oriented policing, and consequently
this seems to indicate that the police in Sao Paulo still have a long way to go. They
do not seem willing to renounce that portion of their power, this may be because they
feel that the security challenges faced cannot be fought without a militarized
response. Even though they maintain a militarized component, I am ranking
community policing in Sao Paulo in the middle of the second tier of my typology
because of the extensive partnering with civil society organizations, improvements in
trustworthiness and use of other community oriented policing like strategies.
Case II: Mexico
Like Brazil, Mexico has a high crime rate and a decentralized police force that
is renowned for being corrupt and abusive at all levels. It currently has police at the
federal, state and municipal level, and a military that is involved in the domestic war
against the TCO’s and which has appropriated many characteristics and duties
typically found in a police force. Human Rights Watch reported in February 2013
that during President Felipe Calderon’s six-year presidency at least 250 people were
“disappeared” by security forces, the security force which appears most frequently in
their report is the local police. They link 95 disappearances to local police forces and
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13 to federal (the rest are either Army or Navy).102 In addition to being abusive, the
police are not effective; an estimated 10% of crimes committed are prosecuted, this
clearly does not include unreported crimes and, like in the rest of Latin America, the
cifra negra is suspected to be vast.103
Attempts at police reform began in the 1990’s under President Zedillo. The
majority of the reforms have attempted to improve human rights, enhance
coordination between the various forces, and improve technology, discipline,
recruitment and training, to name a few areas.104 Various presidents have also
debated federalizing the entire police force to enhance coordination and discipline.
Most recently, the current president, Enrique Pena Nieto, suggested creating a 10,000
strong paramilitary police force, which he would call the Gendarmerie, to fight the
TCO’s and replace the military in its domestic duties. This is a part of his security
plan called, Pacto por Mexico, which will also create unified state-level
commands.105 This is supposed to reduce corruption and increase competence;
Felbab-Brown says that it should theoretically replace the old system in which local
police were treated like local politicians personal, “militias.”106
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President Calderon, Pena Nieto’s predecessor, tried to reform the municipal
police through the, “power of the purse,” which means that they restricted funding for
underperforming municipal police units.107 Sabet notes that this was an attempt to
force the police to become accountable to the federal government; however, it did not
create any sort of accountability to the community. The federal government
simultaneously encouraged the, “limited discretion model,” which limited the police’s
discretion and knowledge of an area in the hopes of limiting corruption and human
rights abuses.108 This prevented the police from understanding how communities
were permeated by crime, and reduced the opportunity for effective intelligence; in
other words, this model was the opposite of community oriented policing.
Sabet argues that the community must become involved in policing in Mexico
for various reasons. One reason which he notes is that the community facilitates poor
policing through their day to day acceptance of corruption and bribery at all levels,
for example, he says that many citizens will offer a bribe before it is requested so as
to avoid trouble.109 However, Sabet also notes that achieving community
involvement in policing will be difficult because, according to his research; people in
Mexico tend to resist the creation of citizen community councils because they
immediately suspect that they are being created to serve clientelistic purposes and that
they will become the pawns of local politicians, as occurred during the PRI’s one107
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party rule.110 During the PRI’s rule politicians effectively doled out favors in return
for votes and control over the community. After one-party rule ended this tradition
continued, particularly at the local level. This needs to be overcome because, as
Felbab-Brown argues, the creation of security councils is important because their
creation involves the community and tends to moderate the police’s use of force.111 If
one accepts Mexico’s leading expert Sabet’s analysis, then the creation of effective
community councils will probably be extraordinarily difficult. Sabet also notes that
lack of continuity between administrations at both the federal and state level can
prevent reforms from having an impact, like in Brazil.
Clearly, the Mexican police needs reform. One city, which has tried to
implement elements of community oriented policing, is Mexico City, also called the
DF. It is the largest city in the Western Hemisphere, and while it is not necessarily a
part of Mexico most affected by the rise in drug related violence, it does have a crime
problem and has had problems with police abuse. The first attempt at community
policing occurred in in the late 1990’s when Cardenas was the mayor, nothing really
happened but it was resuscitated under Lopez Obrador in the early 2000’s and was
formally established as the “Policia de Barrio” (Neighborhood Police) in 2003.
This program aimed to reestablish the confidence of the people in the police
by giving them a voice in policing strategies and police evaluation.112 By 2006 an
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estimated 6% of the preventive police were supposedly trained as community police
officers. They were assigned to specific neighborhoods and required to attend
community meetings. The meetings are supposed to be run by elected members of
the neighborhood; however, Muller notes that after the initial election most
neighborhoods never held another one.113 The elected members are supposed to
inform other members in the community about the information shared at the
meetings, but Muller argues that instead the meetings were “privatized,” and that
members on the committee would use the police to, for example, protect their
personal businesses. In addition, he finds that the police were not trained properly
and that they failed to maintain specific patrolling schedules and locations. This is
counter to community policing.
Although one may think that Muller has a bias, other authors also note that
this attempt was a failure. Koonings and Krujit found that few people were willing to
serve on the councils, and that those who did participate typically tried to coopt the
process.114 In addition, they note that the policing process was further militarized
under Lopez Obrador, which is the opposite of what community policing should be
trying to accomplish. I am inclined to agree with the above-mentioned authors; all
signs point to a failed attempt at community oriented policing in the DF. Like
Muller, I agree that it seems that these reforms were undertaken for cosmetic
purposes, and so they would fall under the first category in my typology, which is
113
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when community oriented policing is a public relations scheme and not a genuine
attempt.
Other cities in Mexico have attempted some elements of community oriented
policing. In Mexicali they developed a neighborhood watch program; however, after
being carried over by two administrations it ended.115 In Tijuana a similar situation
occurred when one administration created neighborhood councils, and a subsequent
administration stopped supporting it. At the state level, Baja California created a
state level community council in 1999. This council was initially granted access to
arrest and other data; however, their access was curtailed under a subsequent
administration. Sabet says that this was the most promising experiment he found in
Mexico.116
Guanajuato also attempted to implement state-level community policing in
2001. The administrator in charge of it, Torres, writes that a pilot program was
implemented in seven communities in seven districts in the central area of the state.
He says that it had support at all levels of government and that initial results were
successful because members of the community reported feeling safer and crime
appeared to decrease. His article was written in 2003, I have found no evidence for
the subsequent continuation of this program, and so it appears that, like the other
Mexican attempts, it eventually fell by the wayside.117 Guanajuato has; however,
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attempted to implement a new community-policing program. In January 2013, the
head instructor from Israel’s policing academy went to Guanajuato to discuss forming
community-policing and bringing the police closer to the community; they plan on
creating ten schools to start training police in the methods the instructor
recommended.118
Recently, there has been much discussion of “community policing” in parts of
Guerrero and the Costa Chica. However, these groups are not composed of
community police officers, they are composed of vigilante type groups. These areas
are rural and have limited policing presence so the villagers (sensibly enough) banded
together to create a sort of policing, without input from the state. They adjudicate
crimes through a local community council.119 In March 2013 a group of “community
police” detained a local police chief in Guerrero on charges of corruption and
collaboration with TCO’s and did not release him until the state agreed to investigate.
I am not arguing that their claims were baseless; however, I am arguing that they are
not community police. Although community policing has many different definitions,
all adhere to the basic fact that police are agents of the state; hence their legitimacy is
intertwined with the legitimacy of the state. In this instance, the existence of these
groups is proof that the state lacks legitimacy because it cannot police its own people.
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Because Mexico is currently suffering from extreme levels of violence, caused
by its war against the TCO’s, the nation may want to wait to implement community
policing at the national level, at least until these groups are weakened. However, at
the local level it should be implemented so as to reduce local police abuse and to
enhance government legitimacy. Additionally, the proposed gendarmerie should be
trained in non-violent policing techniques so they avoid relying on violence. Clearly,
changes between administrations and lack of community enthusiasm and trust are
major obstacles to police reform throughout the nation. Non-corrupt, efficient police
must overcome the lack of trust because the community will slowly accept that the
police can change if they can see the changes. Guanajuato seems to be making a large
initial investment in its new COP program, which signifies political buy-in; however,
it is far too early to judge the experiment. If successful it may serve as a pilot
program for the rest of the nation. The other examples given above all lead to failure,
and consequently fit in the first category of my typology. I did however include them
because Mexico is an important state in Latin America and because the attempts show
that there is some level of consensus that community input is necessary for successful
policing.
Case III: Chile
Like Brazil, Chile has a recent dictatorial past and a strong military culture.
Crime rose during the 1970’s, and subsequently became a key political concern, this
led to the “National Security Doctrine” under Pinochet’s dictatorship which
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emphasized a, “militaristic conception of society.”120 After the dictatorship ended in
1990, crime and the perception of crime among the population rose again, even
though statistics show that Chile has historically had one of the lowest murder rates in
all of Latin America. The perception of crime is particularly strong in the cities,
where 70% of the population lives, because 90% of crime is committed there.121
Unlike Brazil and Mexico, Chile has a federalized police service which is divided
between the Carabineros and the Investigative Police.
The Carabineros are responsible for day-to-day and preventive policing, and
will be the police organ discussed in this section. Unlike the majority of other police
services discussed in this paper they are widely respected and generally perceived to
be relatively non-corrupt and less violent than other Latin American police forces;
82% of the Chilean population reports trusting them.122 This is unexpected because
they were key to repression during the military dictatorship, and, like the Military
Police in Brazil, maintained many of their military characteristics because the junta
was able to negotiate from a strong position during the political transition.
Consequently they have retained their militaristic and hierarchical structure. The
government has proposed moving the Carabineros from the Ministry of Defense to
the Ministry of the Interior on multiple occasions, but this has been forcefully
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resisted.123 Relations between the Carabineros and the government were also strained
during the 1990’s, because some officers were put on trial for human rights abuses
during the junta. Despite these issues, various reforms have been gradually
undertaken and generally well received. Chile is also the only nation in Latin America
without an ombudsman who can investigate and prosecute human rights abuses. This
may be because the junta negotiated from a position of power and demonstrates the
strong hold that the military still has over the nations collective psyche.
During the mid 1990’s Neighborhood Watch type programs were started, and
the government began funding them in 1995.124 In 1998, citizen prevention
committees were formed in various neighborhoods in Santiago, but this program was
rapidly terminated due to apparent issues with getting the neighbors to meet. Bailey
and Dammert say that these meetings were problematic because the role of the
community still lacks definition in Chile.125
In 1999 the Carabineros implemented the Quadrant Plan (Plan Cuadrante)
throughout the nation, after starting in Santiago. This plan certainly has elements of
community oriented policing. Through it the Carabineros are organized, by
decreasing size with a chief of police for a zone, then prefectures, commissariats,
liutenancies, into small forward operating locations inside neighborhoods (called
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avanzadas).126 These increasingly small quadrants are supposed to facilitate greater
interaction with the community and enable police to “identify” with the community
and enhance people’s access to the police.127
Another community policing like element in the Plan is maintaining the same
police in a given quadrant at a certain time, so the police get to know the
neighborhood and the community gets to know them.128 The police should then use
the intelligence gleaned from working in the communities, and crime data sets, to
determine how quadrants will be divided, and so, theoretically, high crime
neighborhoods should have a higher police presence and continuous vigilance.129
This should all lead to successful preventive policing. Additionally, they have special
delegates within each unit who are supposed to respond to community members
concerns and have a unit dedicated to liaising with the community and community
relations.130
In 2000 and 2005 the government developed new performance indicators for
the Carabineros. The 2005 indicators were based on victimization surveys. After
analyzing the responses they started emphasizing the services they provided to the
community and established a new program in 2006 called the, “Quality Improvement
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Program for Police Services to the Community.” This program required the police to
ask people who went to their stations to fill out a questionnaire regarding their
experience. This led to a new National Strategy for Public Security (Estrategia
Nacional de Seguridad Publica) in 2007.131 This strategy called for a victimization
reduction by 10%, a reduction in home robberies by 10% and a reduction in all other
major crimes by 9% between 2006 and 2010.132 To accomplish these reductions they
are trying to reduce the amount of time it takes police to arrive to a crime scene, they
are encouraging people to denounce more crimes, and are trying to strengthen policecommunity relations so as to solve more crimes and reduce impunity.133
The Plan, and all these changes, are displayed prominently on the Carabineros
website, and are frequently touted by Chileans. The website explains that the Plan
was implemented to further “friendship” between the police and the community,
hence their slogan is “a friend, always” (“un amigo siempre!”).134 The Carabineros
will also explain that they do not need community policing since they are “naturally”
community based, and have always worked in the community.135 However, they are
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not a community based police force because as Oviedo phrases it, the “Carabineros
have experience working in the community not with the community.”136
Generally, support for greater community involvement in policing does not
appear to exist in Chile. For example, some sectors of Chilean society want to further
reduce the communities’ role in policing because they think it limits the Carabineros
ability to respond in the moment.137 However, issues, which could potentially be
mitigated through increased community involvement in policing, remain. For
example there are discrepancies between socio-economic groups and their
perceptions of the police, typically the poor trust them the least.138 Lack of
interagency cooperation also remains a problem, and, although the Carabineros do
volunteer in the community, they do not have the ties with non-profits and
community groups that exist in other countries.139 As noted earlier, these ties tend to
enable trust building particularly with poorer segments of the population. Regardless,
they are one of the most trusted police forces in Latin America. Pion-Berlin and
Trinkunas say that they are the closest to what they think the majority of Latin
American police forces should look like. They find that the Carabineros are
professional, relatively non-corrupt and respectful of human rights, and embedded in
neighborhoods in addition to being paramilitary and consequently capable of
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responding to crime.140 Consequently they propose that the Carabineros be used as an
initial model for other Latin American countries.
Although the Carabineros are not a community oriented policing force, I
included this example because they have implemented elements of community
oriented policing in a successful manner. For example, their Quadrant Plan and
maintaining the same officers in the same location has reduced crime successfully,
and this example could be (and has been) carried into other nations that want to
include elements of community oriented policing. In addition, they clearly attempted
to take the communities thoughts into consideration when revamping their security
plan through the use of questionnaires. However, they have not built functional
community councils. This may be impossible since, when councils were created,
community members apparently did not commit to meetings and frequently skipped
or stopped attending. Lack of commitment from the community is one of the major
obstacles to community oriented policing and is consequently understandable.
Another way in which they are not a community oriented policing service is
their unchanged, militarized nature. A major goal of community oriented policing is
reducing the militarization of the police; however, if they can be militarized without
perpetrating violence against the population then this is not as serious an issue.
Because the military and the Carabineros have been able to retain substantial prestige
and power, even though they were involved with the military junta, they seem
unwilling to give that up to the population through greater community involvement.
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Although I think it may be helpful to involve the community more, the Carabineros
overall seem to serve Chile well; however, demilitarizing them and moving them
from the Ministry of Defense to the Ministry of the Interior may be recommendable
so as to increase the police’s autonomy from the armed forces.
Overall, I would include the Carabineros in the higher second tier of my
typology because of the many community oriented policing strategies that they have
implemented successfully. They clearly have not reached the third tier because
community policing is not a part of the Carabineros philosophy, they explicitly deny
it, and since they have kept their militarized characteristics.
Case Study IV: Colombia
Like Mexico, Colombia has suffered from extremely elevated levels of
violence from non-state actors, including, but not limited to, TCO’s, paramilitary
organizations and an active guerrilla insurgency that controls large swaths of territory.
Consequently their security environment is different than that of, for example, Chile;
however, the Colombian National Police is almost as trusted as the Carabineros; their
public confidence levels are between 50-65%.141 Like the Carabineros, the National
Police are centralized under one federal command. The police had been extremely
unpopular and feared, but during the 1990’s and into the 2000’s various reforms were
undertaken.
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In 1991 the nation implemented a new Constitution that aimed to make the
nation more democratic. This lead to police reforms in 1993, which were considered
important because it was an attempt at reform; however, the reforms did not
accomplish anything.142 In 2003 and 2006 a new Organic Law for Policing and
Security was implemented, which subdivided the police into State headquarters, a
direction of civil security, rural security, anti-kidnapping squads, traffic and
transportation police; despite these changes the centralized command remains
intact.143 This has apparently assisted in making the police more effective and
efficient. Because of the extreme security environment that exists in the country, I
will be focusing on community oriented policing attempts in Bogota. Bogota is now
relatively safe and has experimented with community oriented policing on various
occasions. Because of this it is the clearest case to judge.
The first attempt at community oriented policing occurred in 1998 after the
Chamber of Commerce paid for some policemen to study neighborhood policing
techniques used by the police in Barcelona at the Universidad Javeriana in Barcelona.
They hoped that they would learn how to encourage, “a closer relationship with the
community, peaceful coexistence, crime deterrence and excellence in service.”144
Upon their return, the 21 officers selected for this program, were supposed to spread
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their knowledge among the police and create a Community Action Plan for Bogota.145
The Plan was supposed to enable crime prevention, dissuasion and client services.
Subsequently, in 2001, the police conducted a door-to-door survey to try to
understand what risk factors existed in Bogota’s communities. This led to the
creation of Local Safety Fronts and Schools for Public Safety, so as to help the police
accomplish their crime prevention goals. The Fronts were supposed enable selfprotection among residents through alarm systems and phone trees. The Schools
were supposed to educate the community on the police’s role and preventive
measures citizens could take.146 They were also supposed to dissuade crime through
conflict mediation and frequent police patrols by the same officers and were supposed
to enhance client services through a complaints and suggestions system inside police
stations.147
This program led to immediate opposition from mid and high level
commanders because they felt that it would grant the officers too much autonomy.
Vasquez explains that this opposition was predicable because, like the Brazilian and
Chilean police, the Colombian police had a long hierarchical and militarized
history.148 He says that few of the recruits trained in Barcelona remained with the
police for long. However, the police did persevere with the Local Safety Fronts.
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According to Vasquez, these fronts became the only measure for effectiveness and in
2006 there were 9686 Fronts that covered 15% of the cities residents.149 However,
meetings were apparently very irregular both because residents had problems making
it to meetings and because there were more Fronts than community police officers.
The Chamber of Commerce performed a study evaluating the Fronts and found that
30% of the alarm systems did not work, that 39% of the Fronts did not have telephone
trees, and that in total only 81% were active.150 Vasquez goes on to note that:
“paradoxically, the community police force in Colombia is one of the largest
in Latin America, but it is clearly insufficient to fully establish a community
model. While the total number of police officers increased 33% between 1998
and 2007, growing from 101,289 individuals to 134,775, the number of
community police officers increased by a mere 3.4% between 1999 and 2007.
Additionally…this personnel is not equally distributed geographically, nor in
terms of the population served.”151
He also mentions that that community police officers were frequently used for
purposes outside of their purview, such as for crowd control at large sporting events
and as VIP bodyguards, and that this further weakened their role.152
Vasquez’ piece was written before the 2010 launch of the “National Quadrant
Community Surveillance Plan.” It is based off of the Carabineros Quadrant Plan, in
which the police are divided into smaller quadrants, and is supposed to be
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implemented throughout the nation after starting in Bogota.153 Under this plan, the
community police officers ceased to exist as an independent entity within the police
and all police officers are supposed to, “act in accordance with community policing
values and orientations.”154 According to the Plan, police are assigned to a specific
quadrant and consequently should get to know the area and the community well,
thereby enabling preventive action and trust building. In addition, the police should
educate citizens about their role in crime prevention and assist them with establishing
communication networks.155 According to the action plan for implementing the Plan,
they took various factors into consideration when designing the quadrants such as
danger, risk factors, and the socio-economic background of the residents and tried to
meet with community leaders before implementing the quadrants so as to design them
successfully.156
They are also supposed to improve their services through actionable
intelligence; the Plan creates a Sectoral Center for Information and Police Strategy
(CIEPS, Centro de Informacion Estrategica Policial Seccional) which requires local
police stations to funnel intelligence to the Center. This will theoretically enable
better crime fighting strategies because they will be able to locate hot spots and
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prevent crime. Throughout the action plan the authors emphasize relations with the
community and working with service providers and community leaders.
This Plan is different from Chiles’, because, unlike the Chilean Plan, the
importance of the community and relations with it are stressed throughout and
because they self-identify as a community oriented policing program. The intense
community involvement would indicate that the police in Colombia is willing to
renounce a portion of their power to encourage greater transparency and respect for
human rights. Unfortunately, the Plan is too new to judge; however, it seems to be a
large improvement over previous Colombian attempts at community policing. Even
the earlier attempt, with the disorganized Fronts, indicated that people in community
policing areas felt safer, and consequently one can hope that this will improve upon
it.157 There has been an intense financial investment in the Plan, over $2 million on
training alone in the first year. This investment apparently demonstrates that political
will exists. If the Action Plan is implemented as it is described than it may be the
most dedicated and comprehensive community oriented policing Plan in Latin
America thus far; however, as mentioned earlier it is too early to judge. If all of the
Plans goals are achieved, which is unlikely but possible, then policing in Colombia’s
cities would reach the highest level in my typology.
Case Study V: El Salvador
Like Brazil and Chile, El Salvador experienced a military dictatorship, unlike
them, El Salvador’s ended after a 13 year long civil war between the government and
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the left-leaning FMLN guerrillas. The Peace Accords, which were signed in 1992,
created all new security institutions, including the National Civil Police (Policia
Nacional Civil PNC). In addition to the National Civil Police, towns have a local
municipal police; however, the National Police are responsible for most preventive
and investigative policing. According to the Accords, the new police force was
supposed to be composed of 1/5 former guerrillas, 1/5 former National Police and 3/5
civilians who were uninvolved in the conflict; this proved difficult from the start as
more former National Police were allowed in than was technically permitted.158 After
the Accords, crime rates rose rapidly, as did allegations of police committing human
rights abuses and extrajudicial killings.159 Although initial public opinion polls
showed that the people trusted the new police, this soon changed as crime rates and
abuses skyrocketed, and to this day the police remains one of El Salvador’s most
distrusted institutions.160
Soon after the Accords the US, the UN and other international institutions
started working with the Salvadoran government to try to reform the police.
Between 1999 and 2002 they implemented a CompStat like program called
“Eficacia,” after being taught by and receiving funding from the United States
Department of Justice. This was supposed to enable them to find priority areas and
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prevent crime; however, “Eficacia” also placed a major emphasis on arrests as a
measure for success.161 The elevated arrest levels led to El Salvador’s famously
overly crowded prisons; a Salvadoran report finds that prisons are currently operating
at 299% of their capacity and that many people are in pre-trial detention.162 The
Police also attempted community meetings in 1999, to hear the public’s opinion on
their strategies and their concerns; however, this did not lead to concrete changes
even though the public viewed the meetings positively.163
The continuing growth in crime, particularly the murder rate, led to calls for
more aggressive tactics against criminals. This led to the “Mano Dura” (formally
knows as the Emergency Anti Delinquency and Organized Crime Law) laws part I
and II, in 2003 and 2008.164 These laws enabled the police to arrest people who
looked like they may be a part of a gang; this led to more over-crowding and did not
decrease violence or crime in any way. Some scholars actually believe that it may
have helped increase crime because jail serves as a “finishing school” for criminals
where they can make contacts and learn from others.165 The overcrowded prisons led
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to gang wars within the prisons, so the two main gangs, the Mara Salvatrucha and
Barrio 18 were eventually separated by prison, this enabled the gangs to solidify their
organization and hierarchy and to train newer members, thereby strengthening
them.166 The murder rate eventually reached such levels that the Salvadoran
government brokered a truce between the two gangs last spring, and this did seem to
initially diminish homicides although the truce is currently suffering and homicides
have escalated in some areas.
The Mano Dura strategies obvious failure has led to a shift away from these
tactics, and led some areas to community oriented policing. Vanderbilt University, in
conjunction with USAID, performed a Latin American Public Opinion Project
(LAPOP) in 2012 and part of this survey was evaluating the impact of community
oriented policing in Central America. They found that 32% of Salvadorans reported
seeing police talking to the community and attending meetings.167 This is
comparatively high next to other Central American nations. In addition, they reported
that El Salvador has the most community oriented policing in Central America, for
example, police are stationed in public schools, they give talks to students about illicit
narcotics and the dangers incurred by joining a gang, and are involved in sports
programs.
The Discipline through Sport (Disciplina a traves del deporte) program
received particular acclaim. It was started in 2011 by the PNC. Through the program,
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300 police officers were placed in 166 of the highest risk schools in and around San
Salvador to engage with students. Some of the police officers became coaches to
encourage the students to trust the police and eschew crime. According to a
newspaper article from El Salvador, in 2011, 136 students were killed, but in 2012
none were killed from the schools which had the program.168 El Salvador also has the
lowest perception of corruption among Central America countries, excluding Costa
Rica.169 Despite these apparent successes, people polled for the LAPOP study
reported that they still only denounced crimes to police officers they knew and trusted
personally (which shows that corruption remains a concern) and that the police
continued arbitrarily detaining young people who were standing on street corners
without proof of their criminality or criminal connections.170
These national level attempts at community oriented policing seem to be
having some impact (if not necessarily on crime) on the level of trust a community
places in the police. As discussed earlier this is important because trusting the police
could be viewed as a proxy for trusting, and consequently legitimizing, the
government, which is extremely important in a nation which had a relatively recent
civil war and continues to suffer from widespread violence.
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Some municipalities attempted elements of community oriented policing
before the large-scale nationwide attempts. The town of Santa Tecla is one such
example. The town is one of San Salvador’s satellite towns, and was reportedly one
of the most violent in the nation. In 2000, the newly elected mayor, Mayor Ortiz,
engaged with the community and started, “long-term plans that prioritized human and
social development, citizen security, building capacity and coordination among local
government agencies…with a strong emphasis on citizens’ participation.”171 The
main focus of these plans was on crime prevention and “recuperating” public spaces
through innovative means.
To prevent crime they started “School Scholarships,” for children from
kindergarten through university. This program paid children $15-50 a month for
receiving good grades and for performing community service.172 Community service
could include assisting with the “recuperation,” for example by helping clean the city
and green spaces, fixing roads, and installing better lighting in problem areas. Mayor
Ortiz was reelected and, after many community forums, in 2004 community members
started developing the Municipal Policy for the Prevention and Citizen Security. The
Policy’s main goal was homicide reduction and implementation began in 2005. In
2006, the Observatory for the Prevention of Crime was founded to map locations
where crime occurs frequently so the police can target those areas through preventive
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patrolling. The patrolling was undertaken through joint patrols with both the PNC
and the municipal police, which was under the Mayor’s offices direct control.
Joint patrolling enabled community policing because the community already
knew some of the officers, and theoretically reduced corruption because the two
policing services were able to check each other. The Mayors reforms continued, and
in 2008 a municipal management system was started. This system brought together
all levels of government; municipal, state and federal to coordinate violence reduction
and was subsequently updated in 2009.173 Although crime has not disappeared from
Santa Tecla, homicides decreased there in 2007 and 2008 while they increased
dramatically throughout the rest of the country. This success enabled them to seek
outside funding and donations, for example from the UN, so as to expand their
program and become less reliant on unpredictable Salvadoran government funding.
Various groups have highlighted the Santa Tecla example as a successful and
innovative approach to policing, most recently in the OAS’ “Scenarios for the Drug
Problem in the Americas” report, where they also note the “significant” reduction in
homicide rates.174
Recently, El Salvador has undertaken some innovative steps to reduce the
violence which has plagued the country since the end of the civil war, most notably
the aforementioned attempts at community policing and the truce which was brokered
between the two largest gangs over the past year. Although it is impossible to judge
whether or not community policing has helped with the reduction of violence, the
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Santa Tecla case seems to prove that community oriented policing can fight crime if
the efforts are integrated at all levels of government and with the community. Other
authors say that a trusted nonprofit or NGO is necessary to broker between the police
and the people, but this case seems to prove that trusted members of the government
can also enable change. In this example, both members of the government and
members of the police gave up substantial amounts of decision-making power to the
community.
In Santa Tecla they used virtually all elements of community oriented
policing: community councils and input so they knew what the people cared about,
foot patrols by police officers who were familiar, focusing on intelligence led
policing, and working with other entities such as schools, and they appear to be
succeeding. This case also proves that a high level of police, government and
community commitment is necessary for community policing to succeed. Overall,
Santa Tecla is the closest to example discussed to achieving community policing as
explained in the third level of my typology, because it does seem that they are
attempting a full cultural shift, and not a purely strategic shift.
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Chapter 4: Conclusion
As discussed throughout this thesis, a nation’s police service is inextricably
linked with overall state legitimacy both because they are supposed to enforce the
laws and because they are one of the most visible representatives of the state.
Unfortunately, the police in many Latin American nations (particularly if one
excludes Chile, Colombia and Costa Rica) is distrusted by the majority of the
population and this generally delegitimizes the state. People do not trust their police
because they are widely perceived as violent and corrupt, and, as discussed in the case
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studies in the previous chapter, this perception has a strong base in reality. In
addition, the police are perceived as inefficient and incompetent. Consequently many
people do not report crimes, and this has led to the infamous cifra negra in Latin
America, where the majority of crimes go unreported.
This situation has led to various attempts at police reform, from the local to
the federal level. This trend began in earnest in the early 1990’s after most states in
the region became democratic. One of the most popular policing reforms of the past
twenty years has been to adopt community oriented policing rhetoric and strategies.
As discussed in the second chapter, community oriented policing is one of the most
internationally popular forms of policing, and virtually all governments claim that
their police work with and for the community; however, it does not have a formal
definition. I argued that community oriented policing should include both strategies,
such as block-by block policing and community security councils, as well as a
fundamental philosophical shift where the police view themselves as an integral part
of the community and vice versa.
In theory, if a nation or city achieves a high level of community-police trust,
as should occur with community oriented policing, then more crimes should be
solved because of better intelligence, the police are less likely to abuse people
because they know them and know that they will be held accountable, and people will
be more likely to report crimes. All of these are issues in Latin America, which is
why community oriented policing reform has been attempted many times throughout
the region and funded by various governments and donor organizations.
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In my typology I tried to organize community oriented policing strategies by
costliness to the police to evaluate a police department’s level of commitment to
community oriented policing. I defined costliness as the amount of power that the
police was willing to renounce to the community. In my case study chapter I
subsequently found that, as I suspected, the more costly the step, the less likely it was
to succeed. For example, all the police services in the case studies attempted blockby block policing and creating community councils, which can be relatively less
costly steps; however, more costly steps such as genuine evaluation performed by an
outside body and reducing the use of force, were rarely implemented.
The case studies also demonstrated the many issues a government can
encounter with implementing police reform, and particularly with implementing
community oriented policing reform. Some of the most common issues were: lack of
political commitment (as in Mexico), difficulties with reducing the use of force (as in
Brazil), lack of community involvement (everywhere, but particularly notable in
Chile), issues with granting greater police autonomy because higher ranking officers
oppose it (everywhere, particularly notable in the initial Colombia example), and, of
course, issues with evaluation. This last one was skipped or barely implemented in
all cases except for in Belo Horizonte and Santa Tecla.
As discussed in the previous chapter, Santa Tecla comes closest to achieving
community oriented policing as discussed in my typology because there appears to be
full community, government and police involvement. This case also does not
conform to the belief that community oriented policing has a minimal impact on
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crime because the town registered a noticeable drop in crime while the rest of El
Salvador experienced a rise in crime. Santa Tecla also demonstrates how important
high-level, continuous, political support is because the impetus for the changes came
from a reformist mayor. Lack of political support caused many other community
oriented policing programs in other locations to collapse. In addition, the mayor
successfully engaged other parts of the government and civil society members in
Santa Tecla, such as the school system, and this contributed to their success. This
proven success led to international attention, and funding from the UN, which both
granted legitimacy and allowed them to expand the program. Because of its’ success,
Santa Tecla makes a strong argument for community oriented policing as a successful
alternative to a heavily militarized policing strategy, which is what El Salvador had
experimented with previously.
Using Santa Tecla as the ideal model could help one when creating a strategy
for a government or police department that wants to implement COP. The case
demonstrates how important including members of the government, the police, and
civil society when creating a COP program is. Involving these various sectors from
beginning enables one to create a stronger program because it gives each of these
sectors a stake in the programs success, and allows for greater community
involvement from the beginning so people can voice their potential concerns and
suggestions. One could also hope that this would mitigate the effects of a political
regime change because the other sectors could keep pressing for the ongoing reforms.
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Once designed, a successful program should include various COP strategies
such as maintaining the same police in the same area, granting the police on the street
greater discretion, mapping crimes, hosting citizen forums to understand the
community’s concerns, and emphasizing crime prevention instead of repression. This
requires changing the way in which police are trained, to instill respect for human
rights, the law and for working with the community to solve issues. Training the
police through a university, in addition to the academy, also seems to be effective
because it enables police officers to learn from and interact with civilians. In addition
it may require working with an outside group so as to accurately map crimes.
Regarding the citizen forums, perhaps incentives could be offered so as to encourage
people to join, and to continue attending.
The Santa Tecla case also shows that COP programs are more successful
when police reform occurs alongside other programs, such as the incentives to keep
young people in school and volunteering in the community. This both prevents
youths from perpetrating crimes and gives them greater pride in their community.
Utilizing financial incentives was clearly successful in encouraging young people to
join the programs, and could help overcome issues with youth enrollment such as
those in Minas Gerais. The early exposure to a non-abusive and corrupt police force
will hopefully create a generation which is not afraid of the police and who will
report crimes and assist with providing information that could solve crimes. This
constitutes a cultural shift, from one of fearing the police to one of respecting and
assisting the police, and such a shift will clearly take time. The successful experiment
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in Santa Tecla has been ongoing for over a decade, and so perhaps this is a good
metric to estimate the amount of time police reform can take.
Lastly, a successful COP program must include evaluation mechanisms to
ascertain which programs work and which ones do not. As discussed earlier they
should perform studies to measure the: (1) impact on the reduction of crime and
violence (2) perception of citizen insecurity (3) levels of police violence and
corruption (4) levels of trust/distrust between community and police (5) expansion
and continuity of the programs (6) collaboration with other bureaucratic agencies and
(7) the level of community participation in COP programs. These studies would
preferably be performed by an outside agency that does not have a stake in the
answers so as to improve their credibility and validity. The studies should allow a
police department to decide which programs need to be improved, strengthened or
ended.
The 2010 Colombian Plan closely mirrors the strategy outlined above, and, if
it is successfully implemented, it may reach a high level of community oriented
policing in the parts of the nation with state presence. However, as noticed in some
of the other case studies, an excellent Plan and good intentions do not necessarily lead
to reform, unless long-term commitment comes from many parties including from the
community itself. Because Colombia’s citizens appear to trust their police more than
most other Latin Americans already, community involvement may be easier to
achieve. I noted that this will only work in the parts of Colombia that already have
state presence; many parts of the state still lack effective government presence
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because they remain under guerrilla or paramilitary control. Once these areas are
retaken, installing a functioning police force will be one of the first steps that the
government will take to ensure law and order and political legitimacy. This is typical
of all counterinsurgency strategies because the police are necessary for enforcing the
state’s laws and they are strongly identified with state presence.175
Overall, I do think that implementing community policing strategies in Latin
America should improve policing in the region. In all the case studies (except for in
the DF), polls showed that the people did trust the community police more than the
regular police, even if they did not think they had an impact on crime. Trust
development and the perception of being more secure are almost as important as
actual security because it legitimizes the state and means that people are more likely
to report crimes to the police and assist them with investigations. As noted in the
case of Santa Tecla it can also eventually contribute to greater security, instead of just
the perception. Consequently I think that states should continue pursuing community
oriented policing reforms and should try to spread them further geographically.
Additionally, community oriented police are usually less corrupt and abusive than
non-community oriented police, and this could be helpful in Latin America where
police abuse remains a major issue. In addition, although community oriented police
still have problems reaching poorer segments of the population they seem to have less
difficulties than other police, perhaps because they are less abusive and because
keeping the same police in one area forces them to interact with the community. One
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example of this might be the UPP in Sao Paulo, although their overall success cannot
be judged yet, particularly because they have yet to spread to many of the cities
favelas.
Although community oriented policing remains in usage throughout the
United States and parts of Europe; in many places it has combined with “problem
oriented policing,” to form yet another strategic shift. Problem oriented policing
(POP) calls for an even greater emphasis on preventive policing, police discretion,
and on less reliance on the criminal justice sector and more on social service and civil
society agencies. According to the U.S. Department of Justice’s Problem Oriented
Policing Center, problem oriented policing is compatible with community oriented
policing because both require the, “systematic use of partnerships and problemsolving techniques, to proactively address the immediate conditions that give rise to
public-safety issues such as crime.”176 As this becomes a more common part of the
dialogue in policing it will surely spread to Latin America as well; however, this new
itineration demonstrates the general consensus that community involvement,
preventive policing, and police discretion are key to good democratic policing and
consequently I do not think that this shift devalues the importance of the community
oriented policing fundamentals.
In conclusion, although community oriented policing may be imperfect, it is a
major improvement over the militarized policing model that existed in Latin America
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previously. Implementing it, as with all reforms, takes time and commitment;
however, when done well it does appear to enhance both human security and state
legitimacy.
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